This paper studies nonparametric identification in binary choice games of complete information. We allow for correlated unobservables across players. We propose conditions under which the binary choice game is a so-called potential game and impose that the selected equilibrium maximizes its associated potential function. Our framework is formally equivalent to a multinomial choice demand model where a consumer can elect to purchase any bundle of products. We present a separate identification result for two-player games that does not rely on equilibrium selection.
Introduction
Our paper presents identification results for two classes of models that we show are formally equivalent. For clarity, we discuss the two models separately in the introduction.
Discrete Choice Games
We study identification of static, binary choice games of complete information with two or more players. Such models include games of product adoption with social interactions, entry games, and labor force participation games, among many others. 1 In these models the interaction effects capture the strategic interdependence among the decisions of players and are therefore a fundamental target of estimation. Interaction effects are often hard to distinguish from unobserved preferences that are correlated across players, as these two sources of interdependence have similar observable implications. For example, similar smoking behavior among friends may be due to peer effects or to correlated tastes for smoking. Likewise, firms may tend to enter into geographic markets in clusters because the competitive effects of entry are small or because certain markets are profitable for unobservable reasons. Though it is well known that not taking the correlation of unobservables into account can lead to a serious bias in the estimates, much of the empirical literature assumes some kind of independence or conditional independence. We introduce the class of potential games to model strategic interactions and propose an identification approach that allows for correlated unobservables across players. A game is said to be a potential game if it admits a so-called exact potential function, which is a real-valued function defined on the space of pure strategy profiles such that the change in any player's payoffs from a unilateral deviation equals the change in the associated potential. In an influential paper, Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that any maximizer of the potential function is a Nash equilibrium of the associated game (for exact potential games) and that this function is uniquely defined up to an additive constant. Thus, the set of maximizers does not depend on the specific potential function that we use and the potential offers an equilibrium refinement. Under mild conditions, in our model the maximizer is unique with probability 1. As we will discuss in more detail below, one necessary requirement for a game to admit a potential function is that interaction effects, but not standalone utilities from actions, be groupwise symmetric.
Recent theoretical and experimental work has provided economic justification to the potential function refinement. Most importantly for our approach, Ui (2001) shows that if a unique Nash equilibria maximizes the potential function, then that equilibrium is robust in the sense of Morris (1997a, 1997b) , particularly the 1997b paper. Roughly speaking, a Nash equilibrium of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game with payoffs almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium that generates behavior close to the original equilibrium. Ui does not show that all robust equilibria maximize a potential function in a potential game, but, at a minimum, the maximizer of the potential selects one such robust equilibrium. There is also experimental evidence remarkably consistent with this equilibrium selection rule in the minimum effort (stag hunt) game (Van Huyck et al. 1990 , Goeree and Holt 2005 , and Chen and Chen 2011). An advantage of using any equilibrium selection rule is that the model can make unique counterfactual predictions. As structural analysis is often motivated by a desire to estimate policy counterfactuals, some selection rule will increase the precision (and ease of replication) of certain conclusions in a typical empirical paper estimating a game theoretic model. This paper explores the power of the potential function selection mechanism from an econometric perspective. 2 As we explain below, the equilibrium selection rule based on potential maximizers not only completes the model, but it also links observed choices to a single maximization problem that has an alternative economic interpretation: under this refinement the game is observationally equivalent to a single agent discrete choice model for bundles of goods.
The identification strategy that we pursue relies on exclusion restrictions at the level of each player. These restrictions yield observed regressors that affect the payoff of one player but not the others and enter payoffs additively separably. These exclusion restrictions have been called special regressors in, for example, the literature on discrete choice (Lewbel 1998 , Matzkin 2007 , Berry and Haile 2010, Fox and Gandhi 2012). Our identification strategy also requires a condition under which the inequalities implied by choice data can be inverted in the unobservables. This condition calls for a vector of choices such that whenever individual deviations are not profitable, then that vector of choices maximizes the potential function associated to the game. We prove that this restriction is always satisfied when there are two players, when the interaction effects are negative (i.e., games of strategic substitutes), and when the interaction terms have arbitrary signs but are not too large in absolute value (i.e., concave games in the sense of Ui 2008). Our restrictions are enough to nonparametrically identify the entire structure of the game: players' subutilities of choosing each action as a function of the regressors and the actions of other players as well as the distribution of potentially correlated unobservables.
The parametric identification and estimation of static, discrete choice games of complete information has been recently studied by Bajari et al. (2010) , Beresteanu et al. (2011), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) , and Galichon and Henry (2010). Our paper departs from this literature in that it is nonparametric and demonstrates point rather than set identification. Given the trade-offs, our approach is more restrictive in other respects: we focus on the binary actions case (enter or not, smoke or not) and assume a specific equilibrium selection rule. Unlike some work on identification for complete information games, our proofs do not rely on identification at infinity. We do require large support on regressors to identify the joint distribution of the unobservables in the tails, just as in the binary and multinomial choice literature (e.g., For the special case of two players, we offer an alternative proof of identification that does not rely on equilibrium selection and the symmetry restriction on the interaction effects needed for the game to admit a potential function. Building on Tamer (2003), Berry and Tamer (2006, Result 4) study identification in two-player, submodular games where the key special regressors enter multiplicatively instead of additively. Both results, theirs and ours, require knowledge of the signs of the interactions terms. The advantage of our identification argument with respect to these two papers is that we do not rely on identification at infinity to recover the interaction terms. 4 
Discrete Demand for Bundles
Under the equilibrium selection rule based on potential maximizers, we show that the binary game is formally equivalent to a multinomial choice demand model where a consumer can elect to purchase any bundle of products. Therefore, our paper also investigates identification in multinomial choice models for bundles of goods. When applied to these models, we identify the stand-alone payoff of each choice, the terms representing complementarities or substitutabilities among products, and the joint distribution of the unobservables for the individual goods. Here again, we allow for correlated tastes for alternative goods, a distinct explanation for purchasing bundles of goods from true interdependences in consumption. For example, consumers could be seen to often purchase both cable television service and large-screen televisions because there are complementarities in the consumption of these two goods or because consumers with a high stand-alone utility for cable television tend to also have a high stand-alone utility for large-screen televisions. Our identification approach, relying on regressors that affect the stand-alone utility of one product but not the other, can distinguish complementarities in utility from correlated unobservable preferences.
Gentzkow (2007a) studies a parametric demand model for interdependent goods. He focuses on demand for print and online newspapers, allowing the marginal utility of consuming one good to depend on whether the other good is consumed as well. Athey and Stern (1998) study a model where firms have the possibility to combine individual activities in order to achieve their objective, and these activities are complements. To our knowledge, we are the first to give conditions for nonparametric identification in models such as Gentzkow's and Athey and Stern's. The sufficient conditions we propose to identify the distribution of the unobservables are economically similar to some of the requirements imposed in tangentially related identification papers. For example, Berry, Gandhi and Haile (2011) provide a sufficient condition under which a system of demand functions (with continuous outcomes such as shares) can be inverted in unobservables. Their condition applies to goods that are (connected) substitutes, and is loosely related to our result on games of strategic substitutes. Matzkin (2007) studies the inversion of simultaneous equations in models with continuous outcomes, imposing quasi-concavity. As we explained earlier, we suggest a discrete version of her requirement. 5 
Estimation
We do not formally explore estimation because the estimation problem is relatively straightforward conceptually once identification is established. One could apply simulated maximum likelihood with sieve-based approaches for modeling the distribution of the unobservables and the also infinite-dimensional standalone utilities and interaction effects (Chen 2007) .
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the game. Section 3 defines potential games, provides a precise condition under which the games we study admit a potential function, and sheds light on the mechanism by which the potential selects among multiple equilibria. Section 4 provides the identification results for potential games. Section 5 shows identification in two player games without relying on an equilibrium selection rule or on symmetry in interaction effects. Section 6 presents identification results for models of discrete demand for bundles of goods. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are collected in an appendix.
The General Game
We consider a simultaneous discrete choice game with complete information. The set of players is N = {1, ..., n} . Each player i ∈ N chooses an action a i from two possible alternatives {0, 1} . We denote by X ∈ X ⊆ R k a vector of observable state variables (with x the realization of the random variable) and let ε ≡ (ε i ) i≤n ∈ R n indicate a vector of random terms that are observed by the players but not by the econometrician. The random vector ε is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function (CDF) F ε|x . We allow the unobservables to be correlated even after conditioning on the observable state variables. The payoff of player i from choosing action 1 is
while the return from action 0, U 0i (a −i , x, ε i ), is normalized to 0. The first element of (1), u i (x), is the stand-alone value of action 1, and v i (a −i , x) captures the effect that the choices 6 of other players have on player i. We denote this game by Γ (x, ε) .
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A vector of decisions a * ≡ (a * i ) i≤n is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if, for all i ∈ N ,
We write D (x, ε) for the equilibrium set (in pure strategies) of Γ (x, ε). The same conditions that will facilitate identification of the game guarantee that D (x, ε) is non-empty.
The purpose of our analysis is to recover the structure of the game from available data on choices and covariates. Before formalizing our objective, we introduce potential games.
Potential Games
In game theory, a potential function-or, more precisely, an exact potential-is a real-valued function defined on the space of pure strategy profiles such that the change in any player's payoffs from a unilateral deviation is equal to the gain in the potential function. When a game admits such a function it is called a potential game. 4 This concept was first used in economics as a way to prove existence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. 5 The reason is that the set of maximizers of the potential function corresponds to a subset of equilibria of the related game. In finite games, the potential function has a finite set of values and always has a maximizer. It follows that the equilibrium set (in pure strategies) of any finite potential game is guaranteed to be non-empty. We will argue below that the distribution of unobservables, , in our model implies that a unique pure strategy equilibrium will maximize the potential 3 The additive separability of u i (x) and v i (a −i , x) in U 1i (a −i , x, ε i ) does not impose any restriction on the model; it is just a convenient way to write the payoffs. On the other hand, the additive separability of ε i in U 1i (a −i , x, ε i ) is a restriction in the sense that it eliminates the possibility of interaction effects between the unobservables of player i and the choices of other players in the game. 4 Monderer and Shapley (1996) also define ordinal and weighted potential games. We study identification for exact potential games. Thus, throughout, when we say potential, we mean exact potential. This follows the recent theoretical literature on equilibrium refinements, which focuses on exact potentials (e.g., Ui 2000 Ui , 2001 . 5 According to Monderer and Shapley (1996) , this concept appeared for the first time in Rosenthal (1973) to prove equilibrium existence in congestion games.
function with probability 1 (over ). Therefore, a potential maximizing equilibrium always exists and is unique with probability 1. Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that when a game admits an exact potential function, this function is uniquely defined up to an additive constant. Thus, the set of maximizers does not depend on the specific potential function we use and the potential offers an equilibrium refinement. Important work has been done to address whether this selection rule is economically meaningful. Ui (2001) shows that if a unique Nash equilibrium maximizes the potential function, then that equilibrium is generically robust in the sense of Morris (1997a, 1997b) , particularly the definition in the 1997b paper. Roughly speaking, a Nash equilibrium of a complete information game is said to be robust if every incomplete information game with payoffs almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium that generates behavior close to the original equilibrium. See Ui for a formal definition. All robust equilibria do not necessarily maximize a potential function in a potential game, but, at a minimum, the maximizer of the potential selects one such robust equilibrium. Ui writes that "It is an open question when robust equilibria are unique, if they exist." In lab experiments studying the so-called minimum effort game, observed choice data were shown to be consistent with the maximization of objects close to the potential function associated to the game (Van Huyck et al. 1990 , Goeree and Holt 2005, and Chen and Chen 2011). For example, Van Huyck et al. find that subjects converge to high and low effort levels according to the prediction of the potential maximizer refinement. 7 While we do not restrict ourselves to only minimum effort games, it is interesting that the potential maximizer refinement can explain the subtle experimental evidence in this literature.
From an econometric perspective, finite potential games are attractive for at least two reasons. First, by offering a meaningful equilibrium selection rule, the potential function completes the model. Second, this function links observed choices to a single maximization problem that relates to other relevant economic problems (such as demand for bundles) and aids identification. We next specify the definition of a potential function and then provide a necessary and sufficient condition for Γ (x, ε) to be a potential game. In what follows,
Γ is called a potential game if it admits a potential function.
Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that Γ is a potential game if (and only if) cross effects on payoffs are symmetric for every pair of players. Ui (2000) provides an alternative characterization of this class of games, which has the additional advantage of describing the potential function. The next result derives from Ui (2000, Theorem 3). We write S(a) ⊂ N for the set of players who select action 1 in a,
Proposition 1. Γ is a potential game if and only if there exists a function
n and all i ∈ N ,
A potential function is given by
If ε has an atomless support, then the maximizer of the potential function in Proposition 1 is unique with probability 1. By assuming that observed choices correspond to the potential maximizer, we therefore guarantee there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies in the data generating process. 8 The next example applies Proposition 1 to the case of two players. It clarifies the conditions under which the game is a potential game and sheds light on the mechanism by which the potential selects an equilibrium when the model makes multiple predictions.
The payoff of player i can be written
There is only one set S to consider, i.e., {1, 2} . Interaction terms are given by
Thus, by Proposition 1, Γ is a potential game if (and only if
in which case the potential function can be written as
Therefore, interaction terms have to be the same for both players for the game to admit a potential function. We write Φ (x) = Φ ({1, 2} , x) to simplify the exposition. Because Γ is a finite potential game, it always has at least one equilibrium in pure strategies. When the equilibrium is unique, it is always a potential maximizer. Under multiple equilibria, the criterion by which the potential function selects one of them depends on the sign of the interaction effect, as we explain next. We assume no tie events in the analysis below.
When Φ (x) ≤ 0 and the game has multiple equilibria, then the equilibrium set is D = {(0, 1) , (1, 0)}. In this case, (0, 1) maximizes the potential if
and the maximizer is (1, 0) otherwise. Thus, the equilibrium selection rule induced by the potential function predicts that the player choosing action 1 shall be the one with the highest stand-alone value.
Alternatively, the equilibrium set is D = {(0, 0) , (1, 1)} when Φ (x) ≥ 0 and the game has multiple equilibria. It can be easily checked that (1, 1) maximizes the potential if
The maximizer is (0, 0) otherwise. That is, players coordinate on (1, 1) if the product of deviation losses from selecting action 0 as compared to action 1 while the other player selects action 1 are lower than the product of deviation looses from selecting action 1 instead of action 0 when the other player selects action 0. In this case, the potential maximizer corresponds to the less risky equilibrium of Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
Example 2. (Three-Player Game) Let N = {1, 2, 3}. Each player has its own standalone utility. The interaction terms are Φ ({1, 2} , x), Φ ({1, 3} , x), Φ ({2, 3} , x) and Φ ({1, 2, 3} , x). Then, for example, the utility of choosing action 1 by player 1 is
These two examples shed light on the restrictions embedded in Proposition 1 for a game to admit a potential function. Each interaction term Φ (S, x) needs to be the same across all players in S ⊂ N . While interaction terms have to respect this groupwise symmetry, the stand-alone values are allowed to deeply differ across individuals. Consider the example of entry by discount realtors in the United States (e.g., Ellickson et al. 2010 , Jia 2008 ). The assumption of groupwise symmetry rules out that Walmart's entry in a geographic market lowers the profits of Kmart more than Kmart's entry lowers the profits of Walmart. We do allow the monopoly profit function of Walmart to vary considerably from that of Kmart, and we impose no restrictions on the joint distribution of the unobservables entering the profits of Walmart and Kmart. In the three-player case, the interaction term for both Kmart and Walmart entering can differ from the interaction term for both Kmart and Target entering, for example. There is a separate term Φ ({1, 2, 3} , x) for all three players (Kmart, Target, Walmart) entering.
Many empirical applications impose that the Pareto optimal equilibrium is always selected in coordination games (see, e.g., Gowrisankaran and Stavins 2004, and Hartmann 2009). Under positive spillovers, this amounts to selecting the largest equilibrium (which always exists in this set-up). The criterion based on the potential maximizer makes predictions that are more in line with the promoters of coordination failures (see, e.g., Cooper and John 1988). Which selection device is more appropriate depends on the specific application we are dealing with; more research needs to be done to address this question. We should remark here that our results in Section 5 on the special case of two players offer a natural environment for performing a nonparametric test of equilibrium selection.
Identification in Potential Games

Assumptions and Main Result
For our identification purpose, we will assume that Γ admits a potential function and that observed actions correspond to a potential maximizer. Indeed, we consider games where observed choice behavior derives from the maximization problem
We assume the econometrician observes the vector of covariates and choices, x, (a i ) i≤n , for a cross section of independent n-player games that share the same structure Π = (u i ) i≤n , Φ, F ε|x . These independent games can be different markets or different groups of friends, according to the particular application. The objective of the analysis is to combine initial assumptions with data to learn about Π.
We define
By our initial normalization, W (a = (0, 0, ..., 0) , x) = 0. For expositional ease, we order the elements of {0, 1} n in terms of the lexicographic order so that a 1 = (0, 0, ..., 0), a 2 = (1, 0, ..., 0), ..., and a 2 n = (1, 1, ..., 1).
We indicate by W (a , x) and ε (a ) the (2
respectively. Thus, for each a ,
captures the probability of observing choice vector a conditional on X = x, or in simpler notation, Pr (a | x). 9 The researcher can identify Pr (a | x) directly from the data.
We now introduce our assumptions and then discuss how these restrictions are satisfied in alternative environments.
More formally, let us define
Thus ε (a ) is the vector j ε (a ) j≤2 n ,a j =a , which has a distribution dF ε(a )|x . Then,
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and Φ (S, x) ≡ Φ (S, x ) for all S ⊂ N such that |S| ≥ 2.
Assumption 2:
The conditional distribution of each player's X i given the other covariates has support on all of R.
Assumption 3: (i) ε is independent of X and we write F ε|x as a consequence; and (ii) E(ε | x ) = E(ε) = 0.
Assumption 4: ε has an everywhere positive Lebesgue density (on all R n ) conditional on
Assumption 5: For each x there exists a known vector a ∈ {0, 1} n with the following properties. For all x, where x = ( x , x), and for all ε, V (a, x, ε) is maximized at a if
Assumption 1 requires exclusion restrictions at the level of each player, meaning we have n excluded regressors. It assumes X ≡ X , X includes a subvector X of player-specific factors that enter payoffs in an additively fashion. These are the special regressors familiar from the literature on binary and multinomial choice models without bundles (e.g., Manksi 1988 and Lewbel 2000). Exclusion restrictions are key to identifying F ε|x separately from the interaction effects. The intuition is simple: X i only affects player j's action through interaction effects. So interaction effects must be present if changes in the realization x i correspond to changes in the marginal probability of player j's action.
Assumption 2 is a standard large support restriction on the special regressors. Without such a restriction, one cannot identify the tails of the distribution of F ε|x , just as in the literature on binary and multinomial choice. This use of large support is not what is informally called in the literature identification at infinity, which in our model would involve using only covariate values x that set the probability of all but one agent taking the binary action to be 1 or 0. This in effect turns a multi-player game into a single-agent choice model. Identification at infinity would never allow the identification of the joint distribution of the vector ε, which is key to our separate identification of correlated unobservables and interaction effects. Tamer (2003) did use an identification at infinity argument to establish parametric identification of the interaction effects in two-player games. Berry and Tamer (2006, Result 4) also looked at two-player games where special regressors enter multiplicatively and identified the distribution of unobservables without identification at infinity but used identification at infinity to identify the other parameters. The lack of a player-specific coefficient on x i is just a scale normalization: utility is measured in the units of x i for each player.
10
Assumption 3(i) is necessary to recover the distribution of unobservables ε from variation in the special regressors x. Assumption 3(ii) provides a location normalization. For any x , the mean of ε is not separately identified from u i (x ), which subsumes the role of any intercept.
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Assumption 4 gives probability zero to tie events. It also insures that P W (a , x) | x; F ε|x is continuous and strictly monotone in some of its arguments in the vector W (a , x) (e.g., Matzkin 1993, Assumptions 2.5 and 2.6). We revisit the qualification "some of" below.
Assumption 5 is a key economic restriction that is new to our paper. It requires that there exists a vector of choices (known by the econometrician) that maximizes the potential function when individual deviations are non-profitable. In the next subsection, we provide three sufficient conditions for Assumption 5 to hold.
The structure Π = (u i ) i≤n , Φ, F ε|x is said to be identified whenever for two values, Π 1 and Π 2 , there exist values a and x where Pr (a | x; Π 1 ) = Pr (a | x; Π 2 ). Here Pr (a | x; Π) is the probability of observing the actions a given covariates x when the true structure is Π. By Assumptions 1-4, establishing identification for one point x will extend identification to a set of x with positive measure. Our main identification result follows.
The proof of the theorem is the direct consequence of two lemmas, which we state separately in order to give some intuition for the steps of the identification argument. In this lemma's proof, we leverage Assumption 5 and the special regressors X to trace the distribution F ε|x . Given Assumption 5, this step is inspired by arguments in the literature on binary and multinomial choice without bundles. The vector W (a , x) affects the value of equilibrium probabilities P W (a , x) | x; F ε|x . The second lemma argues that different parameter values give different W (a , x) and, by Assumption 4, different probabilities Pr (a | x). On its surface, this lemma is also analogous to arguments in the literature on binary and multinomial choice without bundles (e.g., Matzkin 1993). However, the arguments in the case of discrete games (and later, multinomial choice over bundles) are more complex for one key reason. In multinomial choice without bundles, under Assumption 4, the equivalent to P W (a , x) | x; F ε|x is strictly monotone in each element of the equivalent to the vector W (a , x). In our setting, this does not necessarily hold, which can be seen best by example.
Example 3. Consider the two-player game from the previous example. Let Φ (x ) < 0 for all x . Say we are calculating the probability of the outcome a = (0, 0). This occurs when the following inequalities hold
Because Φ (x ) < 0, when the first two inequalities hold then the last one is always true. Therefore, the probability of the outcome a = (0, 0) will not be strictly monotone in one of the elements of W ((0, 0) , x) , i.e., u 1 (x )+ x 1 +ε 1 +u 2 (x )+ x 2 +ε 2 +Φ (x )−0. In this case, the empirical moments Pr ((0, 0) | x) for all x will not identify the interaction effects. The proof of Theorem 1 states that some other action profile a can be found such that Pr (a | x) identifies the interaction effects.
By Assumption 4, P W (a , x) | x; F ε|x is strictly monotone in the set of inequalities that are not implied by other inequalities. Our identification proof exploits the fact that this set of inequalities depends only on the values of the interaction effects Φ (x ), not on the realization of the unobservables. This paper does not explore estimation. However, P W (a , x) | x; F ε|x is the key ingredient into the likelihood as a function of the infinite-dimensional objects in the structure Π = (u i ) i≤n , Φ, F ε|x . In likelihood-based estimation, sieve approximations would likely be necessary for each of the infinite-dimensional objects (Chen 2007 ). More practically, given a limited sample size a researcher might use a flexible functional form for only the important unknown functions in the model. The most important unknown functions could be the interaction effects and the distribution of unobservables, if distinguishing these two explanations for correlated actions in the data is a key empirical objective.
In some cases, players will be anonymous, meaning that player indices i have no common meaning across markets. In a study of smoking peer effects, we might have five friends in each group of such friends. In an entry application without a focus on chains, we might have two potential entrants. In these cases, it is reasonable to impose that the function u i (x ) actually does not vary by the index of the agent i. Further, the interaction effects Φ (S, x) should depend only on the number of players taking the action, not the identity of the other players. Finally, the random vector ε should be exchangeable, conditional on x , in the indices of the players. All these restrictions are special cases of the general result in Theorem 1. In a similar model (demand for bundles), Gentzkow (2007b, Proposition 2) exploits the linearity of utilities in the special regressors in order to analyze the counterfactual comparative statics of action probabilities in covariates. The same approach to comparative statics can be used here upon identification of the structure Π. The next section proceeds in the opposite direction: we use monotone comparative statics to facilitate identification. More precisely, in the two-player case we use how action probabilities vary with the special regressors to learn the sign of the interaction effect.
Sufficient Conditions for Assumption 5 4.2.1 Two-Player Games
The next lemma states that Assumption 5 always holds in two-player games. The proof of Lemma 3 in the appendix involves two steps. We first show (using monotone comparative statics techniques) that the sign of Φ (x ) is identified from data. We then prove that this information is sufficient for Assumption 5 to hold. To shed light on this idea, recall that by Example 1, if Γ is a two-player game we can write its potential function as (a 1 , a 2 ) . Under Assumption 1, V has increasing differences in both (a 1 , x 1 ) and (a 2 , x 1 ). Then, by Topkis' theorem (see the appendix), arg max V (a, x, ε) | a ∈ {0, 1} 2 increases in x 1 (with respect to the strong set order). By Assumption 3(i), ε is independent of x 1 . It follows that Pr (a 1 , a 2 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) increases with respect to stochastic dominance in x 1 . In turn, this means that Pr (a 1 = 1 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) and Pr (a 2 = 1 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) increase in x 1 . The same holds with respect to x 2 .
Alternatively, if Φ (x ) ≤ 0, then V is supermodular in (a 1 , −a 2 ) and (under Assumption 1) it has increasing differences in both (a 1 , x 1 ) and (−a 2 , x 1 ) . Using the previous argument, we get that Pr (a 1 = 1 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) and Pr (a 2 = 1 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) increase and decrease in x 1 , respectively. In this case, the opposite holds regarding x 2 .
The last two results show that x 1 affects Pr (a 2 = 1 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) in opposite directions depending on the sign of Φ (x ). Thus, the sign of the interaction term can be identified from data. With this information, it is easy to check that Assumption 5 holds with a = (1, 0) or a = (0, 1) when Φ (x ) ≥ 0, and a = (0, 0) or a = (1, 1) when Φ (x ) ≤ 0.
Negative Interaction Effects
The second sufficient condition we propose relies on strategic substitutabilities among players. The next lemma shows that Assumption 5 holds if V (a, x, ε) has the negative singlecrossing property in (a i ; a −i ) for all i ∈ N . Lemma 4. Assume V (a, x, ε) has the negative single-crossing property in (a i ; a −i ) for all i ∈ N , i.e., for all a i > a i and all a −i > a −i (in the coordinatewise order) we have
Then Assumption 5 holds with a = (0, 0, ..., 0) for all x .
In this case, identification of F ε|x will use data on the fraction of markets or groups where all agents take action 0, i.e., Pr ((0, 0, ..., 0) | x) . The single-crossing condition in Lemma 4 would be satisfied if, for instance, Γ were a game with negative interactions, i.e., a submodular game. This restriction is often assumed in the entry games often estimated in industrial organization.
Concavity for Discrete Domains
Potential games that admit a concave potential function have been widely studied in economics. The reason is that when the potential function has this property, then the set of maximizers coincides with the equilibrium set of the underlying game. Ui (2008) introduces the concept of discrete concavity for potential games with discrete strategy spaces. His condition guarantees that local optimality of a vector of choices implies global optimality. The next lemma is based on Ui (2008, Proposition 1).
Lemma 5.
Assume that, for all a, a ∈ {0, 1} n with a − a = 2,
Then Assumption 5 holds with any a ∈ {0, 1} n for all x .
Concavity imposes non-trivial restrictions on the cross effects of multivariate functions and, in our model, the support of unobservables and regressors. In particular, if the unobservables and regressors are allowed to take values on the entire real line, then the interaction effects need to be identically zero for concavity to hold globally. Thus, this approach is nontrivial only if the large support portions of Assumptions 2 and 4 are simultaneously relaxed.
For this reason, we cannot recommend basing identification off of concavity explicitly. However, one can view Assumption 5 as a weaker (local) version of concavity that is compatible with our other restrictions.
Two-Player Games Without Selection Rules
The potential equilibrium selection rule for point identification in binary action games is particularly relevant to the case of three or more players. Here we provide a proof of identification in two-player games that does not impose any equilibrium selection rule. As Bajari et al. (2010) point out, the data generating process is now a mixture over equilibria in the regions of ε under which there is more than one equilibrium. As the literature (Tamer 2003, etc.) has exploited for the parametric case, our identification result will rely on the fact that some outcomes only occur as unique equilibria in the two player case.
As we do not impose the potential selection rule, we do not require that interaction effects have the pairwise symmetry property described above. We allow the interaction effect for husbands' actions on wives' utilities to differ from that of wives' actions on husbands' utilities. Berry and Tamer (2006, Result 4) , following Tamer (2003) , study identification in two-player, submodular games where the key special regressors enter multiplicatively instead of additively. The advantage of our approach is that it does not rely on identification at infinity to recover the payoff terms. As it was earlier defined, we let v i (x ) be the interaction effect of the other player's action on i's utility. Theorem 2. In the two-player game, assume that players follow a pure-strategy equilibrium (but not necessarily a potential function maximizer) and that the game is either supermodular or submodular. Under Assumptions 1-
The full proof is in the appendix. Here we provide a sketch of the proof for the supermodular case. When v i ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, then (1, 0) and (0, 1) are unique equilibria. The probability that the first player chooses action 1 and the other one action 0 (given x) is given by
Given that ε has a zero mean, we can use variation in x to identify F −ε 1 ,ε 2 |x . The subutilities u 1 (x ) and u 2 (x ) + v 2 (x ) can then be identified via conditional expectations using variation in x . Similarly, we can use Pr ((0, 1) | x) to recover u 2 (x ) and u 1 (x ) + v 1 (x ). Therefore (u i , v i ) i≤2 is identified. The distribution of unobservables can be recovered from F −ε 1 ,ε 2 |x . A similar argument follows when the interactions are negative. The nonparametric identification result in Theorem 2 relies on knowing the signs of the interaction terms, but is independent of the equilibrium selection rule that guides players choices. Thus, the two-player game offers a very natural environment to empirically test competing theories about equilibrium selection, e.g., risk dominance versus payoff dominance.
Demand for Bundles
Our model for potential games is formally equivalent to a multinomial choice demand model where consumers can pick bundles of individual alternatives. We draw out the equivalence here and therefore present new identification results for multinomial choice models where consumers can purchase bundles of goods.
Think of N as the set of available products for a consumer, and let us denote by x ≡ ( x i ) i≤n the vector of (negative) prices. Prices will play the role of our special regressors in Assumption 1. We need prices to vary across consumers in the sample. This could occur from observing consumers in different markets or at different points in time. We could use other special regressors than prices. For example, if a consumer is choosing between a set of medical offices (say a hospital and an out-patient clinic), each x i could be the distance between the consumer's home and provider i. If the consumer's utility function is quasilinear in income, his or her maximization problem can be written as
This is a special case of (2). Here u i (x ) + x i + ε i is the stand-alone utility the consumer gets from acquiring good i and Φ (S, x ) is an interaction term that captures complementarities or substitutabilities among the subset of goods S. The model restricts unobserved heterogeneity to happen at the goods level; we do not allow unobservables in the Φ (S, x ) terms. Because this is a special case of the potential game studied earlier, the following corollary to Theorem 1 holds.
Corollary 1.
Let there be two goods and let Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then Π = (u i ) i≤2 , Φ, F ε|x is identified. Let there be three or more goods and let Assumptions 1-5 hold. Then Π = (u i ) i≤n , Φ, F ε|x is identified.
The various sufficient conditions for Assumption 5 can be straightforwardly adapted to the demand problem; we emphasize the two goods case in the statement of the corollary. The other possible sufficient conditions are that all goods are substitutes or that utility is discrete concave. There is no need to refer to Theorem 2 here because equilibrium selection is not relevant in consumer choice. Note also that there is no need to generalize the model to allow, for say the two good case, v 1 (x ) = v 2 (x ). There are no asymmetric complementarities in the demand model. We do not discuss price endogeneity here, although this is important in many empirical applications. Various techniques in the literature can be used to resolve price endogeneity in multinomial choice models (e.g., Berry and Haile 2010, Fox and Gandhi 2012).
Gentzkow (2007a) studies a demand model for print and online newspapers with bivariate normal unobservables. We offer a nonparametric version of his result. Importantly, like his paper we allow for correlation in the unobservable tastes for the two goods. We can therefore distinguish complementarities in utility from correlated preferences for products.
Similar conditions to our sufficient conditions for Assumption 5 have been used in tangentially related identification papers. For example, Berry, Gandhi and Haile (2011) provide a sufficient condition under which a system of demand functions (representing, say, aggregate demand) can be inverted in unobservables. Their condition applies to goods that are (connected) substitutes and is loosely related to our result. Matzkin (2007) studies the inversion of simultaneous equations (again representing, say, aggregate demand), imposing (quasi-)concavity as we do in Section 4.2. 3 .
For another example, we can think of N as the set of available practices a firm can use. The problem of the firm is to select the subset of activities that maximize its objective 22 function (3), where u i (x ) + x i + ε i captures the marginal contribution of each activity and Φ (S, x ) is the extra output the firm gets by using the activities in the subset S together. Athey and Stern (1998) provide a framework for testing theories about complementarity in organizational practices within a cross section of firms. They address identification for two specifications of the model that differ regarding the type of heterogeneity across firms: the Random Systems Model (RSM) and the Random Practice Model (RPM). The RSM allows unobserved heterogeneity across firms for both the marginal contribution of each activity and the interaction terms. The specification of the RPM is similar to (3). Our approach to identification and specification of the utility function differs from theirs in that we impose more conditions on payoffs but rely on fewer exclusion restrictions. One way to achieve identification in a model where a consumer can pick bundles of choices is to redefine the alternatives by incorporating in the choice set all combinations of individual options. Doing this, Athey and Stern provide an identification argument that relies on exclusion restrictions for each bundle of choices (i.e., the enlarged choice set). In the demand setting, this would require bundle-specific prices that flexibly vary across consumers or markets. Doing this, one can appeal to nonparametric identification results from the literature on multinomial choice by treating each bundle as a separate good. It is only because we do not rely on bundle-specific exclusion restrictions that our identification results are new.
Conclusion
We explore identification in binary choice games of complete information. We derive conditions under which a binary choice game is a potential game and impose as the equilibrium selection rule that the selected equilibrium maximizes the resulting potential function. This makes our game formally equivalent to a multinomial choice demand model where a consumer can elect to purchase any bundle of products.
We show that the model is identified. We recover from data the subutility function of each player, the interaction effects among each group of players, and the joint distribution of potentially correlated, player-specific unobservables. We state some alternative key assumptions: two players, a submodular game, and concavity of the game. These conditions also have analogs for demand for bundles. For the two-player case, we present a separate identification result that does not rely on equilibrium selection.
It is likely our results will lead to nonparametric identification outcomes in other classes of potential games. For example, Monderer and Shapley (1996) and Qin (1996) discuss the connection between noncooperative potential games and cooperative games. It follows from their results that many cooperative solution concepts can be expressed as in (2), and therefore our previous results can be applied to these types of interactions.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We divide the proof in the next two Lemmas.
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1 (Identification of F ε|x )
By Assumption 5, for each x , there exists a known vector a ∈ {0, 1} n for which for any
where a is obtained from a by changing only a i . By Assumptions 2 and 3, we will show that we can recover F ε|x from variation in x using Pr ( a | x , x). Applying Assumption 5 shows that Pr ( a | x , x) = Pr ( (4) holds for all i ∈ N | x , x) .
Let the new random variable µ i for each i ∈ N be
Let µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ), which is independent of x conditional on x . Therefore,
Therefore, we identify the upper probabilities of the vector µ, conditional on x , at all points ((1 ( a 1 = 1) − 1 ( a 1 = 0)) ( x 1 ) , . . . , (1 ( a n = 1) − 1 ( a n = 0)) ( x n )) .
By Assumption 2 and the fact that (1 ( a n = 1) − 1 ( a n = 0)) is at most a sign change,
has support on all of R n . Therefore, we learn the upper tail probabilities of µ conditional on
x for all points of evaluation µ * . Upper tail probabilities completely determine a random vector's distribution, so we also identify the lower tail probabilities of µ conditional on x , also known as the joint CDF of µ conditional on x . Note that ε i is the only random variable in µ i , conditional on x . By Assumption 3(ii), E(ε | x ) = 0. Therefore, up to the possible sign change in (1 ( a i = 1) − 1 ( a i = 0)), the distribution of ε conditional on x is obtained from the distribution of µ − E (µ | x ) conditional on x .
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2 (Identification of
To facilitate the exposition, recall that
Thus ε (a ) is the vector ( j ε (a )) j≤2 n ,a j =a , which has a distribution dF ε(a )|x . Then,
Each (u i ) i≤n , Φ clearly leads to a different vector of functions W (a, x). Therefore, consider W = W. We first pick an x where the subvector x will satisfy certain properties that we delay discussion of until the end of the proof. Let
n and suppose max a W (a, x) − W (a, x) > 0 (the other case follows by a similar argument).
for all a ∈ C, and
Assume there exists some a ∈ D for which W (a , x) ≥ W (a , x) does not necessarily hold whenever W (a , x) ≥ W (a, x) for all a = a , a (see Example 3). Saying differently, knowing that a maximizes W (a, x) over all a = a , a is not enough to conclude that W (a , x) ≥ W (a , x). We show this always holds below. Then, by Assumption 4
i.e., P W (a , x) | x; F ε|x > P W (a , x) | x; F ε|x . Thus W identified, and (u i ) i≤n , Φ can be recovered directly from these action probabilities.
We now prove that there exists some a ∈ C and a ∈ D for which W (a , x) ≥ W (a , x) is not implied by W (a , x) ≥ W (a, x) for all a = a , a . By contradiction, we will show that if this were not true then (0, 0, ..., 0) ∈ C, which is not possible as max a W (a, x) − W (a, x) > 0.
For each a ∈ C there are (at least) n inequalities that are not implied by the others. These inequalities correspond to vectors of actions that differ from a regarding the action of one single player. To shed light on this point, let a be equal to a except for some player i who selects action 1 at a and action 0 at a . Then W (a , x) ≥ W (a , x) if and only if
All other inequalities, W (a , x) ≥ W (a, x) with a = a , a , will involve at least one other special regressor x j with (j = i). Thus, we can always find a vector ( x i ) i≤n such that W (a , x) ≥ W (a, x) with a = a , a and yet W (a , x) < W (a , x). Thus assume a ∈ C. By repeating this process a times, we will need to assume (0, 0, ..., 0) ∈ C. But this is not possible as we explained before.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof of Lemma 3 relies on Topkis' theorem (see, e.g., Topkis (1998)) and the concept of stochastic dominance. We include a simple version of these concepts next.
Proposition 2. Topkis' theorem: Let f (a 1 , a 2 , x) : A 1 × A 2 × R → R, where A 1 and A 2 are finite ordered sets. Assume that f (a 1 , a 2 , x) (i) is supermodular in (a 1 , a 2 ) ; and (ii) has increasing differences in (a 1 , x) and (a 2 , x) . Then, arg max {f (a 1 , a 2 , x) | (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ A 1 × A 2 } increases in x with respect to the strong set order.
12 (According to this order, we write A ≥ S B if for every a ∈ A and b ∈ B, we have that a ∨ b ∈ A and a ∧ b ∈ B.)
The concept of first order (or standard) stochastic dominance (FOSD), is based on upper sets. Let us consider (Ω, ≥), where Ω is a set and ≥ defines a partial order on it. A subset U ⊂ Ω is an upper set if and only if x ∈ U and x ≥ x imply x ∈ U.
First Order Stochastic Dominance: Let X , X ∈ R n be two random vectors. We say X is higher than X with respect to first order stochastic dominance if
for all upper set U ⊂ R n .
Proof of Lemma 3: (i) By Example 1 and Assumption 1, if Γ is a two-player game, then
is supermodular in (a 1 , a 2 ). In addition V (a, x, ε) has increasing differences in (a 1 , x 1 ) and (a 2 , x 1 ) (here the cross partial derivative is 0). Then, by Topkis' theorem, a * (x , x 1 , x 2 , ε) ≡ arg max V (a, x, ε) | (a 1 , a 2 ) ∈ {0, 1} 2 increases in x 1 . By Assumption 4, the probability that the argmax is not unique is 0. By Assumption 3(i), the unobservables are independent of x 1 . Let x * 1 > x 1 and let U be an upper set in the space of pure-strategy equilibria, then Pr (a ∈ U | x , x 1 , x 2 ) = Pr (a * (x * , x 1 , x 2 , ε) ∈ U | x , x * 1 , x 2 ) ≥ Pr (a * (x , x 1 , x 2 , ε) ∈ U | x , x 1 , x 2 ) = Pr (a ∈ U | x , x 1 , x 2 ) , i.e., Pr (a 1 , a 2 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) increases with respect to first order stochastic dominance in x 1 . Because first order stochastic dominance is preserved under marginalization, Pr (a 2 = 1 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) increases in x 1 (see, e.g., M
..
uller and Stoyan 2002, Theorem 3.3.10, p. 94). In a similar way,
We say f (a 1 , a 2 , x) has increasing differences in (a 1 , x) if, for all a 1 > a 1 and x > x, f (a 1 , a 2 , x ) − f (a 1 , a 2 , x ) ≥ f (a 1 , a 2 , x) − f (a 1 , a 2 , x) .
we can show that Pr (a 2 = 1 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) increases in x 2 .
On the other hand, V (a, x, ε) is supermodular in (a 1 , −a 2 ) if Φ (x ) ≤ 0. In addition, V (a, x, ε) has increasing differences in (a 1 , x 1 ) and (−a 2 , x 1 ) (here the cross partial derivative is 0). By Assumption 4, the probability that the argmax is not unique is 0. By Assumption 3(i), the unobservables are independent of x 1 . Thus, Pr (a 1 , −a 2 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) increases with respect to first order stochastic dominance in x 1 . Because first order stochastic dominance is preserved under marginalization, Pr (−a 2 = 0 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) increases in x 1 , and therefore Pr (a 2 = 1 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) decreases in x 1 . In a similar way, Pr (a 2 = 1 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) decreases in x 2 .
By Assumption 4, unless Φ (x ) = 0, neither Pr (a 2 = 1 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) nor Pr (a 1 = 1 | x , x 1 , x 2 ) are constant as a function of x 1 and x 2 , respectively. From the last two paragraphs, the sign of Φ (x ) is identified from data. 
Since Φ (x ) ≥ 0, then (5) implies u 2 (x ) + x 2 + ε 2 ≤ 0. By this observation and (6) we get that u 1 (x ) + x 1 + ε 1 ≥ u 2 (x ) + x 2 + ε 2 , i.e., V ((1, 0) , x, ε) ≥ V ((0, 1) , x, ε) . A similar claim holds if we select ( a 1 , a 2 ) = (0, 1) . For Φ (x ) ≤ 0, Assumption 5 holds by selecting ( a 1 , a 2 ) = (0, 0) or ( a 1 , a 2 ) = (1, 1) . The proof is almost identical so we omit it.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Assume Γ (X, ε) is supermodular, i.e., v i (X) ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2. Under Assumption 4, when (1, 0) is an equilibrium, it is the only equilibrium with positive probability. Thus, under Assumptions 1 and 4, Pr ((1, 0) | x) = Pr (−ε 1 − u 1 (x ) ≤ x 1 , ε 2 + u 2 (x ) + v 2 (x ) ≤ − x 2 | x) .
By Assumption 3(i), ε is independent of X. We can identify F α|x with α = (α 1 , α 2 ) ≡ (−ε 1 − u 1 (x ) , ε 2 + u 2 (x ) + v 2 (x )) from variation in x. Using the same logic, we can recover F β|x with β = (β 1 , β 2 ) ≡ (ε 1 + u 1 (x ) + v 1 (x ) , −ε 2 − u 2 (x )) .
By Assumption 3(ii), ε is mean independent of X . Then (u i , v i ) i≤2 are identified from variation in x . By Assumption 3(ii), ε has zero mean conditional on x . Thus the previous information allows us to identify F ε|x .
We omit the proof for the submodular case, i.e., v i (X) ≤ 0 for i = 1, 2, as it is almost identical.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Assume V (a, x, ε) has the negative single-crossing property on (a i ; a −i ) for all i ∈ N , i.e., for all a i > a i and all a −i > a −i we have V (a i , a −i , x, ε) − V (a i , a −i , x, ε) ≤ (<) 0 =⇒ V a i , a −i , x, ε − V a i , a −i , x, ε ≤ (<) 0. (7) We next show that Assumption 5 holds with a = (0, 0, ..., 0) .
Assume V ( a i = 0, a −i = (0, 0, ..., 0), x, ε) ≥ V (a i = 1, a −i = (0, 0, ..., 0), x, ε) for all i ∈ N . Then, by (7), for all a −i ∈ {0, 1} n−1 , and all i ∈ N , V ( a i = 0, a −i , x, ε) ≥ V (a i = 1, a −i , x, ε)
Thus, V ((0, .., 0) , x, ε) ≥ V (a, x, ε) for all a ∈ {0, 1} n .
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A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Assume the required conditions of the lemma hold. Then, by Ui (2008, Proposition 1), V ( a, X, ε) ≥ V (a, X, ε) for all a ∈ {0, 1} n with a − a ≤ 1 is satisfied if and only if V ( a, X, ε) ≥ V (a, X, ε) for all a ∈ {0, 1} n . Thus, Assumption 5 holds at any a ∈ {0, 1} n .
